UIC Law Review
Volume 14

Issue 1

Article 5

Fall 1980

The Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-609: A Return to
Certainty, 14 J. Marshall L. Rev. 113 (1980)
Marc W. Sargis

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, and the Contracts Commons

Recommended Citation
Marc W. Sargis, The Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-609: A Return to Certainty, 14 J. Marshall L. Rev.
113 (1980)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss1/5
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For
more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SECTION
2-609: A RETURN TO CERTAINTY
INTRODUCTION

The most important function of the law of contracts is to
1
protect each party's expectation "interest" in the contract.
Each promisee ought to be able to rely upon a promisor's promise that he will fulfill his obligation under the contract so that
the promisee will realize the benefits he expects to obtain from
it. A failure by the promisor to fulfill this obligation is considered a breach of contract, and is normally grounds for the promisee to invoke his right to seek a remedy which will place him in
as good a position as if the promisor had fully performed. In
spite of the desires of the parties to a contract there exist a
number of ways in which an agreement may break down. One
of the most common breaches of contract is anticipatory repudi2
ation.
The Dilemma
An anticipatory repudiation by a party to a contract is a repudiation of his contractual duty before the time fixed in the
contract for his performance has arrived. At early common law,
the British courts held that it was impossible for a party to
breach his contract prior to the time when his performance was
due, for it was only at the time of performance that the promisor3
in fact, as well as in law, failed to perform as he had agreed.
This mechanistic approach was cast aside in Hochster v. De La
Tour,4 which held that an action for breach of contract prior to
the performance date is not premature. 5 The principle enunci1.

4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 959 (1951).

2. The doctrine of anticipatory repudiation has a two-fold purpose;
first, to avoid any further damage to the promisee which might flow from his
being required to continue his own performance after repudiation, second,
to allow him to recover immediately any damages for past expenditures related to the contract. E.g., Hochster v. De la Tour, 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (Q.B.

1853).

3. See, e.g., Phillpots v. Evans, 151 Eng. Rep. 200 (Ex. 1839) (Baron
Parke's opinion).
4. 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (Q.B. 1853).
5. Id. at 926. Lord Cambell stated:
[I] t is surely much more rational, and more for the benefit of both parties, that, after the renunciation of the agreement by the defendant, the

plaintiff should be at liberty to consider himself absolved from any future performance of it, retaining his right to sue for any damages he has
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ated in Hochster was endorsed by the United States Supreme
Court in Roehm v. Horst,6 which involved an action for breach
brought against an alleged repudiator who had intentionally destroyed the subject matter of the contract prior to the date set
for performance. The doctrine of anticipatory repudiation since
Roehm has been acknowledged in an overwhelming majority of
the states and appears to have been rejected only in Massachu7
setts.
The modern doctrine of anticipatory repudiation focuses
upon two distinct types of conduct engaged in by a prospective
repudiator. 8 First, a repudiation may arise when the promisor,
without justification, makes a statement that he cannot or will
not perform. 9 In order for such a statement to constitute a repudiation, the promisor's language must be sufficiently distinct,
unequivocal, and absolute to be reasonably interpreted to mean
that he cannot or will not perform. 10 Second, one may repudiate
by voluntarily putting it out of his power to perform as agreed
suffered from the breach of it. Thus, instead of remaining idle and laying out money in preparation which must be useless, he is at liberty to
seek service under another employer, which would go in mitigation of
the damages which he would otherwise be entitled for a breach of the
contract.
6. 178 U.S. 1 (1900).
7. See Porter v. American Legion of Honor, 183 Mass. 326, 67 N.E. 238
(1903); Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass. 530 (1874). It is doubtful, however,
whether these cases would be followed today.
8. The RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 318 (1932) originally enunciated
three types of conduct and read as follows:
Except in the cases of a contract originally unilateral and not conditional on some future performance by the promisee, and of a contract
originally bilateral that has become unilateral and similarly unconditional by full performance by one party, any of the following acts, done
without justification by a promisor in a contract before he [has
breached by failure to render performance or by hindering performance by the other party] constitutes an anticipatory repudiation which
is a total breach of contract:
(a) a positive statement to the promisee or other person having a
right under the contract, indicating that the promisor will not or cannot
substantially perform his contractual duties;
(b) transferring or contracting to transfer to a third person an interest in specific land, goods, or in any other thing essential for the substantial performance of his contractual duties;
(c) any voluntary affirmative act which renders substantial performance of his contractual duties impossible, or apparently impossible.
9. E.g., Oloffson v. Coomer, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1082 (Il. App. 1973)
(where seller told buyer, at a time when the price for future delivery was
rising, that he was not planting corn because the season had been too wet
and that plaintiff should arrange to obtain corn elsewhere).
10. Statements made in the following cases were held not to be distinct,
unequivocal, and absolute. McCloskey & Co. v. Minwild Steel Co., 220 F.2d
101 (3d Cir. 1955) (statements by a subcontractor that he was having difficultly obtaining necessary materials accompanied by a request for assist-

19801

Section 2-609

upon." Such actions must be both voluntary and affirmative,
or apparently impossible for the
and must make it actually
12
promisor to perform.
The Uniform Commercial Code, 13 in section 2-610,14 has carried forward the basic pattern of the common law. Under section 2-610, the repudiation need not be of the whole contract, but
only of such portion that the loss to the aggrieved party will substantially impair the value of the contract to him. The Code
prescribes three measures to deal with such repudiations. The
aggrieved party may, for a commercially reasonable time, await
performance by the repudiating party. 15 He may also resort to
any remedy provided by the Code for breach, even though he
has notified the other party that he would await his performance
and has urged retraction. 16 And in either case, he may suspend
17
his own performance.
ance); Salot v. Wershow, 157 Cal. App. 352, 320 P.2d 926 (1958) (statement of

inability to pay the contract price when due and a request for an extension).
11. Rhoem v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1 (1900). See note 6 and accompanying text
supra.
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 274 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1974) includes these requirements in its text. The provision reads as follows:
A repudiation is
(a) a statement by the obligor to the obligee that the obligor will not
perform without a breach, or
(b)
a voluntary affirmative act which renders him unable or apparently unable to perform without a breach that would of itself give the
obligee a claim for damages for total breach under § 268.
13. Unless otherwise noted, all reference to the Uniform Commercial
Code Ihereinafter cited as U.C.C.] will be to the 1972 Official Text and Comments. The U.C.C. has been adopted by forty-nine states, the District of
Columbia, and the Virgin Islands. Only Louisiana remains without the
Code. R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF SALES § 2 (1970).
14. U.C.C. § 2-610 reads as follows:
When either party repudiates the contract with respect to a performance not yet due the loss of which will substantially impair the
value of the contract to the other, the aggrieved party may
(a) for a commercially reasonable time await performance by the repudiating party; or
(b)
resort to any remedy for breach (Section 2-703 or Section 2-711),
even though he has notified the repudiating party that he would await
the latter's performance and has urged retraction; and
(c) . in either case suspend his own performance or proceed in accordance with the provisions of this Article on the seller's right to identify
goods to the contract notwithstanding breach or to salvage unfinished
goods (Section 2-704).
15. U.C.C. § 2-610(a).
16. U.C.C. § 2-610(b). A repudiation may be retracted unless the aggrieved party has since the repudiation cancelled, materially changed his
position, or otherwise indicates that he considers the repudiation final.
U.C.C. § 2-611(1).
17. U.C.C. § 2-610(c). Under this section the aggrieved party may also
proceed to identify goods to the contract or salvage unfinished goods.
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Although invoking the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation
appears relatively uncomplicated, its application involves the
evaluation of an unlimited variety of human responses made in
an equal number of contractual settings, 18 thus confronting the
party it is intended to protect with difficult legal and practical
problems. 19 Doubtful and indefinite statements that performance may or may not take place, for example, will not be held to
create an immediate right of action. 20 Moreover, a mere request
for a change in the terms of a contract or even a request for cancellation are not enough in themselves to constitute a repudiation. The promisee's practicaldilemma is this: when the effect
or nature of the prospective repudiator's actions are unclear,
there are no definite guidelines for determining whether an anticipatory repudiation has taken place.2 1 The promisee's legal
dilemma depends on which of the two possible responses he
makes to the promisor's actions. First, he may postpone taking
any action until the date set for actual performance under the
contract arrives, and then sue for breach if such performance is
not forthcoming. 22 Second, he may characterize the promisor's
18. E.

KIONKA, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-A REMEDY FOR PROSPEC-

TIVE INABILITY TO PERFORM, IN THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COORDINATOR 441 (1962).
19. Comment, A Right to Adequate Assurance of Performance in All
Transactions: U.C.C. § 2-609 Beyond Sales of Goods, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1358
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Beyond Sales of Goods].
20. Dingley v. Oler, 117 U.S. 490 (1886). In Dingley, the seller refused to
deliver ice according to the terms of the contract because of an increase in
the market price of ice. The Supreme Court declined to find a repudiation
and explained that:
[a]lthough ... they decline to ship the ice that season, it is accompanied with the expression of alternative intention, and that is, to ship it,
as must be understood, during that season, if and when the market
price should reach the point which, in their opinion, the plaintiffs ought
This, we
to be willing to accept as its fair price between them ....
think, is very far from being a positive, unconditional, and unequivocal
declaration of fixed purpose not to perform the contract in any event or
at any time. In view of the consequences sought to be deduced and
claimed as a matter of law to follow, the defendants have a right to
claim that their expressions, sought to be converted into a renunciation
of the contract, shall not be enlarged by construction beyond their strict
meaning.
Id. at 501-02.
21. Comment, Anticipatory Repudiation Under The Uniform Commercial Code: Interpretation,Analysis and Problems,30 Sw. L.J. 601, 611 (1976).
22. E.g., Oloffson v. Coomer, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1082, 1086-88 (Ill. App.
1973). In Oloffson, the seller unequivocally repudiated a contract for the
sale of corn. The court held that under certain circumstances the aggrieved
party may await the performance of a repudiating party with respect to performance not yet due. The seller's awaiting performance, however, is conditioned upon his; (1) waiting no longer than a commercially reasonable time,
and (2) dealing with the seller in good faith. See also Frost v. Knight, L.R. 7
Ex. 111 (1872), where it was said that:
the promisee, if he pleases, may treat the notice of intention (of the
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actions as being a clear and unequivocal rejection of the continuing obligation and bring suit before the time fixed in the con23
tract for performance.
By selecting the first response the promisee runs the risk
that a court will deem his inaction a failure to minimize avoidable damages. 24 Such a determination may cost the promisee his
right to consequential damages. 25 On the other hand, by selecting the second response, the promisee may find himself a defendant in a suit for anticipatory repudiation brought by the
26
promisor.
The resolution of this dilemma depends upon the answer to
a single inquiry: at what point does the right to suspend performance and bring an action for breach become fixed? With the
answer to this inquiry comes the certainty and stability that
guide commercial men in ordering their affairs.
The Code's Solution
Section 2-609 of the Uniform Commercial Code recognizes
the promisee's dilemma and proposes a solution. 27 It provides a
promisor) as inoperative, and await the time when the contract is to be
executed, and then hold the other party responsible for all the consequences of non-performance; but in that case he keeps the contract
alive for the benefit of the other party as well as his own; he remains
subject to all his own obligations and liabilities under it, and enables
the other party not only to complete the contract, if so advised, notwithstanding his previous repudiation of it, but also to take advantage of
any supervening circumstances which would justify him in declining to
complete it.
23. E.g., Bliss Produce Co. v. A.E. Albert & Sons, Inc., 20 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 917 (App. Div. N.Y. 1976). Here, the notification by a dealer of potatoes
that he would be unable to ship as required due to adverse weather conditions was sufficiently unequivocal to constitute an anticipatory repudiation.
The court stated that the date of notification was the earliest that the buyer

would have cause to take action. A clear exposition of the doctrine by Mr.
Justice Cardozo can be found in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas, 291 U.S.
672 (1935).
24. This characterization is the application of the doctrine of mitigation
of damages with respect to repudiation in advance of the date set for performance. A majority of courts have held that the mitigation principle is
applicable in such cases, and that the innocent promisee cannot recover
damages that could have been avoided subsequent to the repudiation. See
Rockingham County v. Luter Bridge Co., 35 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1929) (contract

to have bridge built repudiated before completion of work).
25. Moreover, under § 2-610, if one awaits performance beyond a commercially reasonable time, he may lose his right to resell or cover since both
remedies must be effected within a commercially reasonable time. U.C.C.

§§ 2-706, 2-712.
26. Suspension of performance without reasonable grounds for insecurity or a distinct and unequivocal repudiation may lead to an anticipatory
repudiation on the part of the party suspending performance.
27. Professor Llewellyan has said:
If there is one thing that makes trouble in ... contracts of any kind for
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means whereby a party may demand adequate assurances of future performance when his sense of security that performance
will be forthcoming when due is impaired. Initially, the aggrieved party is permitted to suspend his own performance and
any preparations therefore, with excuse for any resulting delay. 28 Second, the aggrieved party is given the right to require
adequate assurance that the other party's performance will be
duly forthcoming. 29 Finally, the aggrieved party may treat the
if the assurcontract as breached by anticipatory repudiation
30
ances are not forthcoming or are not adequate.
The enactment of section 2-609 substantially broadened preexisting protections against impending breach. Though no general rule dealing with this problem is to be found in the Uniform
Sales Act, 3 1 that Act did provide protections in some specialized
and limited situations. 32 Thus, where the price became due
before delivery and the seller brought suit to recover it, the
buyer could successfully defend himself if before judgment the
to perform the contract.
seller "had manifested an inability
' 33
or an intention not to perform it."
Augmenting these limited provisions was section 73 of the
Uniform Sales Act, which incorporated "the rules of law and equity," 34 and the Restatement of Contracts. Under the Restatefuture delivery, it is in situations where you are beginning to wonder
whether he (the other party to the contract) is going to perform and
you have not yet got up to the place ... where you can say either he is
insolvent or he had repudiated .

.

. Section 2-609 gives you the wer-

ewithal [sic] for finding out where you are within a reasonable time.
This is certainty. This is the kind of certainty that eliminates litigation.
REPORT OF THE NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION, HEARING ON ARTICLE

2 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 162 (1954).

28. U.C.C. § 2-609, Comment 2. "Suspend Performance" under § 2-609
means to hold up performance pending the outcome of the demand, and
also includes suspending any preparatory action.
29. Id. This principle reflects the familiar practice of inserting clauses
into the contract which permit the seller to curtail deliveries if the buyer's
credit becomes impaired. When held within the limits of reasonableness
and good faith, this principle actually expresses no more than the fair business meaning of any commercial contract.
30. Id. The comment states that this is the principle underlying anticipatory repudiation, whether by way of defective part performance or by repudiation.
31. See 1A UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED §§ 53-55, 63(2) (1950).
32. NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION, HEARING ON ARTICLE 2 OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 202 (1954) [hereinafter cited as N.Y.L.R.C.].
33. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 63(2). This section was of slight impact because of the rarity of transactions which called for payment before delivery.
See also UNIFORM SALES ACT §§ 54(c), 45(2).
34. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 73. Cf. U.C.C. § 1-103 where it is provided that:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles
of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to
capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresen-
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ment of Contracts, the "apparent inability without justification
to perform a condition or promise for an agreed exchange" empowered the other party to change his position and to refuse a
proper but subsequent tender of performance. 35 Such a broadly
36
stated rule, however, had little authority in the cases.
The lawyer's response to this pre-Code dilemma gave rise to
the commercial practice of inserting "insecurity clauses" in a
contract. 37 Such clauses typically give one party to the contract
the right to cancel or suspend performance in the event the
other party's financial responsibility became impaired or unsatisfactory. Cancellation or suspension under an insecurity
clause must be grounded in actual dissatisfaction, based upon
38
reasons neither arbitrary nor capricious.
Notwithstanding these limited protections, section 2-609 was
formulated as a single theory of general application to all sales
agreements looking to future performance. It was intended to,
and does, conform to the desires and commercial practices of
modern-day businessmen. 39 Section 2-609 provides:
(1) A contract for sale' ° imposes an obligation on each party
that the other's expectation of receiving due performance will not
be impaired. When reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with retation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions.
35. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS

§ 323 (1932). Cf.

RESTATEMENT (SEC-

OF CONTRACTS § 275 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1974). See note 12 supra.
36. See also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 280-84, 318(b), (c) (1932).
37. A typical insecurity clause reads as follows:
In the event that payment for goods shipped is not promptly made
in accordance with the terms of this sale; or in the event that the credit
or the financial responsibility of the purchaser becomes impaired or unsatisfactory to the seller, the seller reserves the right to demand cash or
satisfactory security before making shipments. Upon the failure of the
buyer to provide cash or satisfactory security to fully satisfy the seller's
demands, the seller reserves the right to discontinue making shipments
and to cancel the sale, or any part of the sale, thereby terminating all
obligation on the part of the seller for delivery of the goods, or any part
of the goods sold.
James B. Berry's Sons Co. v. Monark Gasoline & Oil Co., 32 F.2d 74, 75
(1929).
38. Id. at 76. The court in Berry's Sons held that if the clause had not
OND)

been inserted into the contract, the court would have implied such a term
into the contract. "[Sluch implied term ... is more than a shield-it is a
sword-and the seller can refuse to deliver except for cash, and sue the
buyer for damages for refusal to accept deliveries and pay cash." No case
since Berry's Sons has held that such an implied term exists if the parties
have not expressly included such a provision in their contract.
39. U.C.C. § 2-609, Comment 2 reveals that its provisions have been
adopted to meet the needs of commercial men in such situations.
40. This term, under § 2-106, includes contracts for the present sale of
goods as well as contracts to sell goods at a future time.
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4
spect to the performance of either party the other may in writing '
demand adequate assurance of due performance and until he receives such assurance may if commercially reasonable suspend
any performance for which he has not already received the agreed
return.
(2) Between merchants 42 the reasonableness of grounds for
insecurity and the adequacy of any assurance offered shall be determined according to commercial standards.
(3) Acceptance of any improper delivery or payment does not
prejudice the aggrieved party's right to demand adequate assurance of future performance.
(4) After receipt of a justified demand failure to provide
within a reasonable time 43 not exceeding thirty days such assurance of due performance as is adequate under the circumstances of
44
the particular case is a repudiation of the contract.

This section reflects the policy of attempting to encourage
the parties to meet and communicate in an effort to clarify or
modify troubled contracts.4 5 A party confronted with an equivocal repudiation can discover the nature and extent of the prospective repudiator's actions without jeopardizing his interest in
the contract, while the prospective repudiator can attempt to
46
Retention of
fuse expectations with changed circumstances.
the contract is the goal, and "the hardening of attitudes that invariably follows the commencement of litigation" is post47
poned.
Section 2-609 is drafted in a very broad and general manner.
A proper use of the section calls for a firm understanding of its
innovative terms.4 8 The purpose of this comment is twofold: (1)
to analyze the meaning of section 2-609, and the cases interpreting it, and (2) to suggest a possible future role for section 2-609
in light of modern business practices.
41. The requirement of a written demand was not expressly stated in
the Code's 1949 version.
42. One may become a merchant in three ways: by dealing, by representing oneself as one who has knowledge, and by being the principal of
one who represents himself as having such knowledge. U.C.C. § 2-104.
43. What is reasonable depends upon the nature, purpose, and circumstances of such action. Such time, however, cannot in any circumstance
exceed thirty days. U.C.C. § 1-204.
44. The N.Y.L.R.C., supra note 32, in its supplementary report on the
Code did not recommend any changes in § 2-609.
45. U.C.C. § 2-609, Comment 1.
46. Cole v. Melvin, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1154 (D.S.D. 1977) (defendant's
failure to answer plaintiffs letters demanding adequate assurance of a contract to buy and sell cattle did not constitute an anticipatory repudiation
where there was no evidence of any objective facts upon which the plaintiff
could base his insecurity).
47. Holt v. Seversky Electronatom Corp., 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1223, 1226
(2d Cir. 1971).
48. N.Y.L.R.C., supra note 32, at 203. Terms used nowhere else in the
Code include "due performance," "adequate assurance," and "insecurity."
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OPERATION AND IMPLEMENTATION

Obligation
Section 2-609(1) imposes an obligation on each party to a
contract not to impair the other's expectation of receiving due
performance. This obligation is implemented by a power to "demand adequate assurances of due performance. '49 Where one
party senses an unwillingness or inability of the other to perform as expected, the risk of failure of consideration is unjustifiably imposed upon him. Since he can no more be expected to
perform when counter-performance is doubtful or uncertain
than when he actually has not received performance, his right to
demand assurances takes effect.50
This right to be free from worry during the interval up to
performance may not, however, be all encompassing. Though
the language of section 2-609 is sweeping, it apparently was not
designed to apply either to unilateral contracts or to bilateral
contracts that have become unilateral through completed performance by the promisee. 51 One justification for excluding
such contracts from the scope of section 2-609 is suggested by
the section's dominant provision: that the promisee can "suspend any performance" for which "he has not already received
the agreed return. '52 Clearly, if one has the power to suspend
his performance, it must be a performance which is yet to be
rendered. In the same light, if one has already received his
agreed-upon return, he may not resort to the power. 53 A second
49. Id. at 201.

50. E.g., Diskmakers, Inc. v. DeWitt Equip. Corp., 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
1016 (3d Cir. 1977) (buyer, after declarations by seller, supplied revocable
letter of credit instead of irrevocable letter of credit as required under § 2325(3) was legally entitled to withold the irrevocable letter if seller's declarations were found to be unequivocal under § 2-610).

51. A bilateral contract is one in which two rights and two duties exist.
In such a contract, each party has a right against the other and each has a
duty of performance toward the other. A unilateral contract is one in which

the promisor manifests an intention that he wants an act or performance in

exchange for his promise. Brackenbury v. Hodgkin, 116 Me. 399, 401, 102 A.
106, 107 (1917).
52. U.C.C. § 2-609(1).
53. Gutor Int'l AG v. Raymond Packer Co., 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 567 (1st
Cir. 1974) (insecurity was held not to be a valid defense to a suit for the
purchase price when the party claiming the defense had already received
the agreed upon return). But see Lockwood-Conditionaire Corp. v. Educational Audio Visual, Inc., 3 U.C.C. Rep, Serv. 354 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966) (in an
action to replevy air conditioning equipment for failure to make complete
payment, the defendant was held to be justified in his demand for assurances since the equipment had not functioned properly during the few days
it was tested); N.Y.L.R.C., supra note 32, at 204 (§ 2-609 also deals with the
problem

where

the

aggrieved

party

has

fully performed

and

counterperformance by the prospective repudiator seems to be impaired).
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justification for excluding such contracts is that sub-section (1)
of 2-609 imposes an obligation of "each party" to a contract. In
the case of a unilateral contract, there is only one promisor; the
legal result is that he is the only party who is under an enforceable legal obligation. Since this sub-section makes the power of
suspension contingent upon each party's owing an obligation to
the other, it must envision a bilateral contract. 54 The final justification is that if the promisee has completed his performance, he
is incapable of minimizing his "postrepudiation damages and
thus, he will not be prejudiced by having to wait out the promisor's time for performance before suing. '55 This final justification is speculative at best and has been criticized as ignoring
56
commercial realities.
Provided that the contract falls within the reach of section 2609, sub-section (1) focuses upon the extent of the security afforded the contracting parties. "Each party," is entitled to receive "due performance. '57 The term due performance, found
nowhere else in the Code, can be defined in one of two ways;
first, it can mean "perfect tender,"5 8 or second, it can mean
something less than substantial impairment. 59 Both interpretations have support,60 though the latter appears more compatible
with section 2-610.61
"Substantial impairment of the value of the contract" is the
Code's manner of testing a party's justification for suspension
54. The argument can be made that the obligation referred to in § 2609(1) is only an obligation not to impair expectations and that expectations
can and most often do arise in unilateral contracts.
55. Beyond Sales of Goods, supra note 19, at 1362.
56. Id. at 1362 n. 23. The author vigorously opposes this limitation and
argues that its proponents ignore the commercial reality that the promisee
may be injured in his affairs generally if not directly.

57. U.C.C. § 2-609(1).
58. U.C.C. § 2-601, the "perfect tender" rule, reads as follows:
Subject to the provisions of this Article on breach in installment
contracts (Section 2-612) and unless otherwise agreed under the sections on contractual limitations of remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719), if
the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the
contract, the buyer may
(a) reject the whole; or
(b) accept the whole; or
(c) accept any commercial unit or units and reject the rest.
59. The substantial impairment test is used in several sections of the
Code including §§ 2-608, 2-610, and 2-612. Substantial impairment is measured by the material inconvenience or injustice that will result if the aggrieved party is forced to wait and receive an ultimate tender, minus the
part or aspect repudiated. U.C.C. § 2-610, Comment 3.
60. Contra, Anderson, Repudiation of a Contract Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 14 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1964) (author contends that
due performance means 100% performance).
61. See note 10 supra.

1980]

Section 2-609

when it appears that he will not receive the performance for
which he has bargained. This standard is applied where there
has been a claimed anticipatory repudiation, 62 when a non-con63
forming installment impairs the value of future installments,
and when a buyer is notified of a material delay caused by the
occurrence of a contingency, the non-occurrence of which was a
basic assumption on which the contract was made. 64 It would
appear that this test should also be used as a working definition
of "due performance" as that expression is used in section 2-609.
Under such a use of the test, the promisee would have the right
to demand adequate assurances and suspend performance only
where the ultimate tender, if received, would result in material
inconvenience or injustice to the promisee. 65 This view is justified because it strikes an agreeable balance between sharply
conflicting interests under the rule-namely, the danger one
party faces when it appears that the other will breach, versus
the danger that an unscrupulous party who wishes to escape his
contractual obligations will make unfounded demands claiming
that his expectations have been impaired. 66 In addition, if due
performance were interpreted as total performance, 67 the aggrieved party in a repudiation situation could evade the requirements of section 2-610 by ignoring that section and proceeding
under section 2-609. He would thereby gain a remedy that section 2-610 never intended him to have: the right to suspend performance when the repudiation does not substantially impair
the value of the contract. 68
62. Id.
63. Under U.C.C. § 2-612(2), a buyer may reject any non-conforming installment if the non-conformity substantially impairs the value of that installment. Under subsection (3), when a non-conformity with respect to
one or more installments substantially impairs the value of the whole contract there is a breach of the whole.
64. U.C.C. § 2-616(1). Under this section if a buyer receives a justified
notice of delay under § 2-615, he may, in writing, terminate or modify the
contract where the prospective deficiency substantially impairs the value of
the whole contract.
65. Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 481 F.2d 781 (5th Cir.
1973) (reversed because the jury did not receive instructions which included the substantial impairment language of § 2-610).
66. N.Y.L.R.C., supra note 32 (comments by Professor Honnold).
67. The "perfect tender" rule has some support in § 2-609, Comment 1,
where it is recognized that the promisedperformance is the most important
element of the bargain struck between the parties. What is promised is full
performance. In addition, if substantial impairment were the correct standard, why wasn't it drafted into the language of the statute?
68. A promisee desiring to avoid an unpleasant contract may assert that
his expectation of perfect performance is impaired in a manner slightly
greater than the common law de minimus rule would except and thereby
escape the rigors of the greater § 2-610 standards. See Comment, Commercial Lau-Uniform Commercial Code-Section 2-609: Right to Adequate
Assurance of Performance, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 397 (1962).
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Reasonable Groundsfor Insecurity
Whether a party in a particular case has reasonable grounds
for insecurity is a question of fact. 69 A court, when considering
whether the demanding party properly deems himself insecure,
can be expected to look to the circumstances that existed at the
time the insecurity arose.70 The section further provides that, as
between merchants, the reasonableness of the insecurity "shall
be determined by commercial standards."' l This reference to
that the
commercial standards, however, carries no connotation
72
requirement of good faith is not equally applicable.
The standard by which insecurity is measured appears to be
a mixture of objective facts, 73 which can be legally equated with
reasonable grounds for insecurity, and subjective concerns.
This mixture flows from Pittsburg-DesMoines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co.74 In that case, the parties agreed that
full payment for a water tank, to be built by Pittsburg-Des
Moines, would be due and payable within thirty days after the
tank had been tested and accepted by Brookhaven. The construction of the water tank was scheduled to begin in April of
1969. Prior to this time, however, Brookhaven's negotiation for a
loan, the proceeds of which were to pay for the tank, had deteriorated, and Pittsburg-Des Moines demanded assurances. The
court held that Pittsburg-Des Moines's subjective questioning in
itself was not enough to demonstrate reasonable grounds for insecurity. A more objective factual basis than what was shown
was necessary.7 5 It follows from the Brookhaven decision that
both objective and subjective grounds for insecurity are indispensable. Thus, where a demand is prompted by purely subjective concerns not rooted in any objective facts, there is no basis
for determining the reasonableness of the demand. 76 Likewise,
where a demand is prompted by objective facts devoid of any
subjective concerns on the part of the demanding party, a lack of
77
good faith is evident.
69. AMF, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 801, 806 (7th Cir.
1976) (after defendant had entered into a contract to purchase a number of
computerized cash registers, circumstances arose which gave defendant
reasonable grounds for insecurity as to plaintiffs ability to perform).
70.

2 ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-609: 6 (2d ed. 1971).

71. U.C.C. § 2-609(2), Comment 3 provides that "reasonable" grounds
are defined by commercial standards rather than legal standards.
72. U.C.C. § 1-203 reads as follows: "Every contract or duty within this
Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."
73. The source of the facts which leads the aggrieved party to conclude
that the other party will not perform is not vital, so long as these facts justify a reasonable belief that the contract in question will be breached.
74. 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 931 (7th Cir. 1976).
75. Id. at 941.
76. Cole v. Melvin, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1154 (D.S.D. 1977). See note 46
supra.
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Although the Code fails to define the term "insecurity," it
does suggest factors to consider when determining its meaning.
Among these factors are the nature of the sales contract; 78 the
repetition, by the prospective repudiator, of the conduct which
caused the insecurity; 79 any insecurity existing in the performance of other contracts legally unrelated to the contract in question; 80 the expanding use of the credit term by the prospective
repudiator; 8 1 and the reputation and rumors as to the stability
and conduct of the party upon whom demand is made. 82 By further generalization these factors and others may be broken
down into two broad categories. An aggrieved party's insecurity
may arise from either a perceived unwillingness or a perceived
83
inability of the other party to perform.
77. Where a party is not subjectively concerned about performance, as
in the case where he has special knowledge as to the ability of the other to
perform, a subsequent demand based on objective factors alone lacks good
faith and may amount to a repudiation of the contract.
78. U.C.C. § 2-609, Comment 3. If, for example, the contract provides
that time is not of the essence, a claim that one is insecure because of a late
payment or delivery is invalid.
79. Kunian v. Development Corp. of America, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1125
(Conn. 1973); U.C.C. § 2-609, Comment 5. Both Kunian and Comment 5
view repeated delinquencies as cumulative.
80. National Farmers Org. v. Bartlett & Co., Grain, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
658 (8th Cir. 1977) (breach of one contract did not justify the aggrieved
party in refusing to perform another separate and distinct contract); Toppert v. Bunge Corp., 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 618 (Ill. App. 1978) (plaintiff justified in refusing to perform remaining contracts with defendant where the
defendant imposed conditions beyond the scope of present and past due
contracts); Northwest Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Continental Forest Products,
Inc., 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1035 (Ore. 1972) (seller not justified in refusing to
deliver a carload of studs ordered under another contract at a time when
buyer had wrongfully refused to pay for a carload of pine already delivered); see also U.C.C. § 2-609, Comment 3.
81. Corn Products Ref. Co. v. Fasola, 94 N.J.L. 184; 109 A. 505 (1920)
(buyer's failure to take advantage of customarily used credit term and an
extension of its credit line are reasonable grounds for seller in invoking insecurity clause); U.C.C. § 2-609, Comment 4.
82. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 18
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 931 (7th Cir. 1976) (rumors to the effect that buyer could
not negotiate a loan); Turntables, Inc. v. Gestetner, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 131
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (rumors that other sellers have been stuck with unpaid
bills of the buyer); U.C.C. § 2-609, Comment 4; see generally 2 ANDERSON,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-609:6 (2d ed. 1971).
83. A promisee's insecurity need only be perceived and not real. In
Harlow & Jones, Inc. v. Advance Steel Co., 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 410 (E.D.
Mich. 1976), the parties entered into a contract calling for delivery in October and November. On the last day of October, the buyer cancelled because
of "late delivery assuming, incorrectly, that since shipment was not likely
until well into November, and considering the usual 30 day transit time,
would mean delivery sometime in December." The court stated that even if
the buyer believed in good faith that the steel would not be delivered within
the contract period, cancellation was not the appropriate remedy; the buyer
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Where a party indicates an unwillingness to perform, two
principles are undermined: that the parties to a contract look to
actual performance, and that a continuing sense of reliance and
security that the promised performance will be forthcoming
when due is an important feature of the bargain. Toppert v.
Bunge Corp.84 is a logical starting point in examining this type
of insecurity. In Toppert, the seller had completed delivery on
two of several contracts he had entered into with the buyer. The
buyer withheld payment in order to bring pressure on the
seller's brother and father to sign and perform certain other unrelated contracts with the buyer. The seller was held to have
reasonable grounds to be insecure and to be justified in having
suspended performance on the future contracts.
A contrary result was reached in Northwest Lumber Sales,
Inc. v. ContinentalForest Products,Inc.85 despite a similar fact
pattern and the near-compelling logic of Toppert.8 6 In Northwest
Lumber, the court held that the mere fact that payment under
one contract is not made when due is not necessarily a reasonable ground for insecurity as to payment under another contract. The court concluded that in the present case there was no
question of the "buyer's financial ability to pay its bills .... ,7
The Northwest Lumber court's reasoning suggests that financial
ability to pay debts controls the determination of the reasonableness of the grounds for insecurity. Such a suggestion was
clearly rejected in Toppert, where there were no doubts about
the buyer's ability to pay its bills. This apparent conflict was
resolved in Ellis Manufacturing Co. v. Brant.88 Ellis holds that,
as a matter of law, failure to receive payment when due is not in
itself an absolute ground for insecurity. "Something more" is
necessary, and it must be found under the circumstances of
89
each and every case.
should have demanded assurances under § 2-609, id. at 421. In Turntables,
Inc. v. Gestetner, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 131 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976), the seller was
justified in suspending performance even though his suspicion that plaintiff

was insolvent may have been inaccurate.
84. 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 618 (Ill. App. 1978).
85. 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1035 (Ore. 1972).

86. In this case, Northwest Lumber entered into a contract with Continental for the sale of a carload of plywood in December of 1968. Continental
sold the carload of plywood to a customer but the order was never shipped

from Northwest Lumber to Continental's customer. Continental was forced
to acquire a substitute car of plywood from another source at a substantially increased price. Thereafter, a dispute arose over Northwest Lumber's
liability for failing to deliver the plywood and Continental declined to pay
for a car of pinewood previously bought from Northwest Lumber. North-

west's response to Continental's actions was to postpone delivery on a third
contract which the parties had entered into, claiming insecurity.

87. Id. at 1040.
88. 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1416 (Tex. 1972).
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Ellis, however, falls short of its goal of defining insecurity by
failing to delineate the factors which are to be considered in
searching for that "something more." It appears that commercial practice yields the two guiding considerations in such cases.
First, the buyer's failure to make payment when due may make
it financially impossible or unreasonably burdensome for the
seller to supply future installments as promised. Second, a
buyer's failure to make payment for one installment or on one
contract may create such reasonable apprehension in the
seller's mind concerning future payment that he should not be
required to take the risk involved in continuing deliveries. 90 If
either of such consequences are demonstrable, the seller has
reasonable grounds to be insecure and may demand assurances.
In Toppert and Northwest Lumber there was no evidence
that delay in payment made it difficult for either buyer to make
future deliveries. To the contrary, both admitted that they could
have delivered had they chosen to do so. The sellers' insecurity,
if any, must therefore have been based on reasonable apprehension, engendered by the buyer's behavior, as to the future of the
contract. In Toppert the buyer's failure to pay was designed to
bring pressure on the seller's father and brother and constituted
a "lack of good faith on the buyer's part and imposed conditions
beyond the scope of the contract." 9 1 On the other hand, in
Northwest Lumber, the seller knew the buyer was withholding
payment solely to cover possible losses on the replaced plywood
order, and there was no apparent reason why the buyer would
92
have been unwilling to guarantee payment on future orders.
Thus, under the circumstances, only Toppert was justified in
suspending performance on the future contracts.
A second type of unwillingness is apparent in the situation
where insecurity is based upon an equivocal remark by the
89. In Ellis, a supplier contended that his failure to deliver materials
was justified because it had reasonable grounds for insecurity because the
buyer failed to pay for the last lot delivered. Under the contract, however,
payment was not due until the materials were installed in certain apartments. Since only a small portion of the materials delivered had been installed, it was not established as a matter of law that the seller had
reasonable grounds for insecurity. Furthermore, the seller's refusal to deliver the last lot was not because of insecurity, but rather in keeping with
the seller's usual practice of attempting to collect all monies due before his

last shipment.
90. This analysis is derived from Plotnick v. Pennsylvania Smelting &
Ref. Co., 194 F.2d 859 (3d Cir. 1952), where it was held unreasonable for a
seller of battery lead to withhold delivery of installments covered under the
contract where the buyer failed to pay for a carload already delivered. The
analysis can be utilized in the case of both buyers and sellers.
91. Toppert v. Bunge Corp., 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 618, 623 (Ill.
App. 1973).
92. Northwest Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Continental Products, Inc., 10
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1035, 1040 (Ore. 1972).
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promisor. Here, a case-by-case approach is employed to measure the reasonableness of one's insecurity in the following manner: First, would a repudiation result if the basis for the remark
in fact existed? If so, the promisee has grounds to be insecure.
Second, did the remarks come from a reliable source? If they
did, the promisee's grounds are reasonable. Copylease Corp. of
'-America v. Memorex Corp.9 3 presents a textbook example of
such a situation. Memorex, attempting to squeeze Copylease
out of a favorable contract, called a meeting between the parties.
At one point during a heated exchange Memorex's attorney
stated that an "unworkable business agreement" existed which
did not represent "any mutually acceptable basis for doing business." He added that in his opinion there was a "substantial
question" concerning the validity of the contract. 94 The clear
import of the remarks was that the contract was not a binding
commitment, thus satisfying the first element of the above analysis. The reliable source requirement was clearly also satisfied,
for the statements were made directly to Copylease by Memorex's lawyer and general manager. Copylease, therefore, had
reasonable grounds for insecurity and could have chosen to sub95
mit a written demand for assurances.
The second of the two broad categories which represent the
aggrieved party's position are the situations in which insecurity
arises from the percieved inability of the other party to perform.
Courts faced with this type of uncertainty place emphasis on the
relative strengths of the objective facts which are claimed to
demonstrate an apparent inability. 96 Powerful objective
grounds for insecurity, for example, were presented in Turntables, Inc. v. Gestetner.9 7 Here, the buyer never paid for goods
already delivered. Its "Fifth Avenue showroom" turned out to
93. 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (Parties entered into a contract whereby plaintiff agreed to remarket three of defendant's products for
an initial 12 month term, defined to commence on the date of first shipment
of a private label toner. A meeting was scheduled to resolve contract differences and at this meeting the statements constituting the plaintiff's insecu-

rity were made).
94. Id. at 322. Along with these statements, Memorex's general manager said, "the business has evolved to such a point that ... I don't want to
continue business under the . . . present relationship."
95. In Markowitz & Co. v. Toledo Met. Hous. Auth., 608 F.2d 699 (6th Cir.
1979) (statements made by defendant's chairman of the board to the effect
that the Authority was unaware of any contract entered into between the
parties and that the Authority had no intention of honoring its commitments, satisfied the requirements of § 2-609, and the builder was justified in
making a demand for assurances).
96. E.g., AMF, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 801 (7th
Cir. 1976) (nonfunctional prototype).

97. 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 131 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).
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be a telephone answering service; its Island Park factory turned
out to be someone else's premises, to which the buyer did not
have access, and in which he leased no space and had no employees, machinery or equipment therein; and another supplier
told the seller that it had been stuck with an unpaid bill of the
buyer's. The seller's suspicions concerning the buyer's ability
and solvency were clearly based on strong objective criteria, and
he was entitled to the benefit of section 2-609 even though his
98
suspicions might have been inaccurate.
Supplementing the two general categories of insecurity are
two instances of conduct which need not meet the above requirements. The first is statutory insecurity under section 2210(5). 99 Under this section, an assignment delegating performance gives grounds for insecurity as a matter of law even though
the demanding party's chances of receiving due performance
are not materally impaired. 10 0 A second instance of conduct
under this heading emphasizes the degree of care which must
be exercised when proceeding under section 2-609. If a demand
for assurances is unwarranted, a suspension of performance is,
of course, grounds for insecurity of the party upon whom the
demand is made. 10 It may also constitute an anticipatory repudiation by the demanding party, for in the absence of a right to
10 2
demand assurance he has no right to suspend performance.
98. Id. In addition to the objective fact-subjective concern criterion,
some courts require something more to trigger the applicability of § 2-609.
These courts require that insecurity must be based upon a change in the
circumstances which existed at the time of the making of the contract. Underlying this requirement is the premise that if an unfavorable risk in deal-

ing with another party exists at the time the contract is entered into, good
business judgment may dictate that assurances be secured before con-

tracting rather than afterwards. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 931, 941 (7th Cir. 1976); accord,
Field v. Golden Triangle Broadcasting, Inc., 451 Pa. 410, 414, 305 A.2d 689, 697
(1973). In the same light it should be noted that a contract's terms can

sometimes negate the existence of any basis for insecurity. For example,
where a letter agreement specifically provided the extent of security which

an assignee corporation was to provide, "the seller cannot later contend
that he was entitled to further security beyond what he originally agreed

to." Id. at 424, 305 A.2d at 696.
99. U.C.C. § 2-210(5) provides: "The other party may treat any assignment which delegates performance as creating reasonable grounds for insecurity and may without prejudice to his rights against the assignor demand
assurances from the assignee (Section 2-609)."
100. Tennell v. Esteve Cotton Co., 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 978 (Tex. 1976)
(the fact that buyer assigned his rights under a contract for the sale of cot-

ton did not constitute a repudiation of the contract for which the seller
could suspend performance where no demand for assurances was made).

101. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 18
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 931, 940-42 (7th Cir. 1976) (suspension was unjustified

since there was no demonstration that reasonable grounds for insecurity
had arisen, and an anticipatory repudiation resulted).

102. Id.
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Demand
When it appears that the applicability of section 2-609 has
been triggered by the impairment of a party's expectation of due
performance, the right to demand assurances ensues. The demand must be supported by the events preceding it 10 3 and the
privilege to make such a demand is preserved as long as the insecurity persists. 10 4 It has been held that, generally, a demand
should be sufficiently specific in order to maximize the effectiveness of the section. 10 5 A specific demand insures commencement of the thirty-day period in which the prospective
repudiator must respond, and also increases the likelihood that
the demanding party will receive the form of assurance that will
obviate his uncertainty. 10 6 But the Code fails to state the degree
of specificity required when making a demand, or even that
some specificity is required. Jurisdictions applying the Code's
07
formulation have further obscured the notion.'
Inherent in the concept of specificity is the notion that section 2-609 must be implemented volitionally. National Farmers
103. Cole v. Melvin, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1154 (D.S.D. 1977) (demand
made before any objective grounds for insecurity does not invoke § 2-609).
104. E.g., Copylease Corp. of America v. Memorex Corp., 18 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 317, 324-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). A demand need not be made as soon as
insecurity arises and one party may urge counterperformance or retraction.
A demand, however, can only be made while a sense of insecurity exists.
105. National Ropes, Inc. v. National Diving Serv., Inc., 16 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 1376 (5th Cir. 1975).
106. A demand stating only that a party is insecure will start the thirtyday period in which assurances must be provided. The promisor has the
discretion, however, of whether his assurance will consist of a promise to
perform or whether it will consist of the posting of a bond. This holds true
even in the commercial setting.
107. In National Ropes, Inc. v. National Diving Serv., Inc., 16 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 1376, 1384 (5th Cir. 1975), the court required a specific demand and
held that a request for accelerated payments from a prospective repudiator,
due to his unstable financial condition, was not considered to be in the nature of a demand.
The demand requirement was satisfied in Cole v. Melvin, 22 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 1154 (D.S.D. 1977), where it read as follows:
If you are not satisfied with this and have any attention [sic] of
backing out on our contract, then please forward the recordation papers
to me so I can sell these heifers up here. If you still want the heifers
then I will gladly keep them for you, they are on a self-feeder of rolled
oats and are doing well except for the couple of young RWF heifers that
haven't come in heat yet.
Please let me know what your plans are as soon as possible.
Id. at 1162.
A demand was also deemed to have been made in United States v.
Humboldt Fir, Inc., 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 736 (N.D. Cal. 1977), where a waiver
of an executory portion of a contract was retracted by a notice that strict
performance would be required. The court decided that the strict performance notice was the equivalent of a demand for assurances.
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Organizationv. Bartlett and Co., Grain,10 8 clearly requires that
a party must actively pursue a remedy under section 2-609 in
order to enjoy its benefits. 0 9 This requirement flows from the
nature of the consequences imposed upon the prospective repudiator 1 0 A search of the cases, however, shows that this requirement is often disregarded. An illustration is found in
United States v. Humbolt Fir, Inc.,'" where, pursuant to sections 2-208112 and 2-209,113 the seller waived the time for performance stipulated in a contract for the sale of timber. The seller
subsequently retracted the waiver and notified the buyer that
strict performance would be required. The court held that the
notification of retraction served as a demand for assurances and
that the buyer's inaction constituted a repudiation of the contract.1 4 Such determinations place both buyer and seller in ambiguous positions. The seller, by failing to make a specific and
intentional demand, is left unsure of whether the thirty-day period has commenced, and is at the mercy of the buyer as to the
108. 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 658 (8th Cir. 1977) (seller's notification to buyer
that seller would not deliver in future until buyer paid substantial sums due
amounted to an anticipatory repudiation where such a requirement went
beyond the terms of the contract, time was not of the essence, and there
was no impairment of the buyer's ability to pay).
109. Id. at 664 n.9.
110. An anticipatory repudiation would result, for example, if assurances
were not supplied within thirty days.
111. 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 736 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
112. U.C.C. § 2-208 provides the following:
(1) Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for
performance by either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course of
performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning of the agreement.
(2)
The express terms of the agreement and any such course of
performance, as well as any course of dealing and usage of trade, shall
be construed whenever reasonable as consistent with each other; but
when such construction is unreasonable, express terms shall control
course of performance and of course of performance shall control both
course of dealing and usage of trade (Section 1-205).
(3)
Subject to the provisions of the next section on modification
and waiver, such course of performance shall be relevant to show a
waiver or modification of any term inconsistent with such course of performance.
113. The relevant portion of § 2-209 provides:
(4)
Although an attempt at modification or rescission does not
satisfy the requirements of subsection (2) or (3) it can operate as a
waiver.
(5)
A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion
of the contract may retract the waiver by reasonable notification received by the other party that strict performance will be required of any
term waived, unless the retraction would be unjust in view of a material
change of position in reliance on the waiver.
114. United States v. Humboldt Fir, Inc., 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 736, 743
(N.D. Cal. 1977).
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form of the assurance he may receive. 115 The buyer, unaware of
the existence of a demand, may not supply assurances even
though willing and able to do so, the result being an uncalled-for
repudiation.116
The demand must be not only specific and intentional but
also reasonable. Section 2-609 does not give the alarmed party a
right to redraft the contract. Whether the individual invoking
the section is merely requesting an assurance that performance
will be forthcoming or is attempting to use it to imply a term into
the contract is a mixed question of law and fact, depending for
its answer in part upon the court's interpretation of the obligations imposed upon the parties. A court will scrutinize a proposed rewriting particularly closely when it involves the very
factors conceded at that negotiation stage by the party now at7
tempting to wield the pen."
Assuming the demand for assurances is based upon appropriate grounds, the Code prevents abuse of the right to demand
by imposing upon it two limitations. The first is a limitation
placed on the scope of what can be demanded. Between
merchants, the nature of the demand is limited by commercial
standards, and the circumstances are determinative. For instance, in AMF, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.,118 the buyer was held
115. A demand should read as follows:
Dear Sir: We feel that our expectation of receiving due performance under our sales contact with you, dated November 25, 1963, is impaired because (here state grounds). We consider these facts to
constitute a reasonable ground for insecurity under section 2-609 of the
Uniform Commercial Code and under paragraph nine of our agreement.
As a result, we demand that you give us adequate assurance of due performance. We would consider the following an adequate assurance:
(here state what is considered an adequate assurance). Unless you
comply with this demand for adequate assurances of due performance
by March 7, 1964, we will treat this contract as repudiated by you. Sincerely yours, (signature)
W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE U.C.C. 950 (1964).
116. It must be remembered that the policy behind § 2-609 is the resolution of conflict before litigation. See notes 27-30 and accompanying text
supra.
117. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 18

U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 931, 942 (7th Cir. 1976). In the negotiation stages, Pittsburgh-Des Moines and Brookhaven changed the terms of the original agreement where 60% of the contract price was due upon receipt of material by
Pittsburgh-Des Moines, 30% upon completion, and 10% after testing. The
terms were modified to provide that 100% of the contract price was due and
payable 30 days after testing. Pittsburgh-Des Moines' request for escrow
financing in effect implied that the original terms were reinstated.
Logically, a party is not reasonably threatened by the very risks he has
assumed under the contract. Only unassumed risks, therefore, furnish reasonable grounds for insecurity. W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO
THE U.C.C. 196 (1964).

118. 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 801 (7th Cir. 1976). Both parties are clearly
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to have been justified in seeking assurances regarding performance and reliability standards on future orders after the delivery
of a defective prototype. 119 Other demands held to be reasonable in the mercantile practice include requiring the procurement of a film owner's certificate stating that ordered films had
not been shown on television; 120 requiring an opportunity to inspect before delivery; 121 and requiring a buyer to deposit suffi1 22
cient cash in escrow to pay for delivered materials.
The second limitation preventing abuse of the right is the
prohibition on repeated demands. Generally, if the promisee
were to make several demands of the same promisor within a
short period of time when a single demand would be sufficient,
.the promisee would be violating the doctrine and fair dealing of
good faith. 123 This is because after the initial demand, the prospective repudiator has a reasonable time in which to supply the
assurances requested. A second demand, therefore, may
amount to a bad faith interference with performance.
Nonetheless, repeated demands have been held to be permissible. In a Connecticut case, for example, a supplier and a
contractor entered into a contract for the sale of plumbing and
heating materials under which deliveries were to be made when
ordered and payments were to be made on the 25th of each
month. The contractor failed to make several payments and the
supplier suspended performance and awaited assurances.
Thereafter, the contractor sent the buyer $5,000, promised to pay
the outstanding indebtedness, and promised to pay for any subsequent orders. Deliveries were then resumed, but the contractor failed to live up to his promises. The supplier again
merchants and are therefore bound by commercial standards. U.C.C. § 2104.
119. In addition to a defective prototype, AMF never repaired the prototype, nor replaced it. Similarly, it was unable to satisfy McDonald's that the

23 machines on order would work. The tendered performance standards
were unacceptable for allowing too much down time and AMF's personnel
were too inexperienced to produce a proper machine. AMF, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 801 (7th Cir. 1976).

120. Appeal of Productions Unlimited, Inc., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 620 (Vet.
Adm. 1966) (demand pursuant to rental service contract for films that the

films be free of television use, was justified where it was discovered that
offered films were available for free television use).
121. Diskmakers, Inc. v. DeWitt Equip. Corp., 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1016

(3d Cir. 1977) (buyer, who was entitled to adequate assurances, was justified in sending revocable letter of credit instead of an irrevocable letter of
credit, as required by contract; such revocable letter was deemed the

equivalent of a demand to inspect before delivery).
122. Kunian v. Development Corp. of America, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1125,
1133 (Conn. 1973) (buyer's repeated failure to abide by its promises justified

seller in conditioning future deliveries only if an escrow deposit was made).
123. See generally Beyond Sales of Goods, supra note 19, at 1381 n.94.
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demanded assurances, but specified it would deliver the balance
of the materials only if an escrow deposit was made. The
demand was
Supreme Court of Connecticut held that a second
124
reasonable.
commercially
being
justified as
Furthermore, it is plain that repeated demands are necessary where the parties have several legally distinct contracts between them. The problem that arises in such a setting is
exemplified in National Farmers Organization v. Bartlett and
Co., Grain.'25 In that case, the parties entered into numerous
contracts, scheduling several for future performance. The buyer
had fallen behind in his account on a single contract that had
presently become due, and the seller suspended performance
on all the outstanding contracts. In holding that the seller's actions were unjustified, the court stated that the seller's demand
"did not seek assuranceof performance on the future contracts;"
it sought only assurance as to the part of the performance that
was past due under the present contract. 126 The seller, therefore, anticipatively repudiated its future contracts with the
buyer when it suspended performance before making a demand.
The importance of National Farmers is its cautionary rule that
when insecurity under one contract leads to a demand for assurances, and such a demand is not directed towards a separate
and legally distinct contract, the demand will be presumed to
relate only to the contract past due.
Before examining the question of what constitutes an adequate assurance, it is imperative to consider the form of the demand. Section 2-609 explicitly states that a demand for
assurances must be in writing. 127 The courts have not compelled a strict adherence to this essential element and have justified such an attitude as a renunciation of the "formalistic
approach."'1 28 The attitude does seem to affirm certain underlying policies and purposes of the Code, such as liberal construc124. Kunian v. Development Corp. of America, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1125
(Conn. 1973).
125. 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 658 (N.C. 1977).
126. Id. at 664 n.9 (emphasis added).

127. Cases supporting the requirement of a writing are: National Farmers Org. v. Bartlett & Co., Grain, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 658, 664 (N.C. 1977);
Teeman v. Jurek, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 506, 510 (Minn. 1977); Copylease Corp.

of America v. Memorex Corp., 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 317, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
128. AMF, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 801, 806 (7th Cir.
1976) (defendant's failure to make a written demand for adequate assurances by plaintiff of due performance was excusable because the evidence
showed plaintiff's clear understanding at the time of a meeting between the
parties that defendant had suspended performance until it should receive
such assurance); accord, Kunian v. Development Corp. of America, 12

U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1125 (Conn. 1973).
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tion and commercial reasonableness. 129 What the courts have
required, however, is that under the circumstances, the
equivalent of a written demand be conveyed to the prospective
repudiator. 1 30 What constitutes "the equivalent to a written demand" is speculative at best, but a face-to-face conversation appears to be enough.' 3 '
Adequate Assurances
Although section 2-609 prescribes no specific standard as to
the form or nature of an assurance, the phrase "adequate assur132
ance" is perhaps the best defined of this section's novel terms.
Whether the reply to a demand is adequate to assure the demanding party of due performance is to be determined in light
of all the circumstances and in harmony with the requirement of
good faith.' 33 Between merchants, the adequacy of the offerred
assurance incorporates commercial standards in addition to
good faith. 3 4 But it is not subjective good faith that is the criterion. 135 Instead, the comments apparently compel recognition of
a reasonable merchant standard. Accordingly, an adequate assurance is one that is sufficient to instill in a reasonable
merchant a sense of reliance that the promised performance will
be forthcoming when due. 136 Such a determination must be
made on an ad hoc basis, except insofar as particular commercial standards may become accepted as a matter of law, and the
adequacy of the assurance might depend upon the character
and reputation of the prospective repudiator. 137 Thus, a satis129. U.C.C. §§ 1-102(1), (2). Among the underlying purposes of the Code
are, the simplification and modernization of commercial transactions, the
continued expansion of commercial practices, and to make the law of commercial transactions uniform. The Code is to be applied liberally to promote such purposes.
130. Kunian v. Development Corp. of America, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1125,
1133 (Conn. 1973) (meeting between parties).
131. E.g., Toppert v. Bunge Corp., 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 618 (Ill. App. 1978)
(meeting between parties).
132. See U.C.C. § 2-609, Comment 4 and examples therein.
133. 2 ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-609:6 (2d ed. 1971).
134. See merchant requirements under § 2-104 at note 42, supra. The relationship between the parties, any prior dealings that they have had, the
reputation of the party whose performance has been called into question,
the nature of the grounds for insecurity, and the time within which the assurance must be furnished are all relevant factors. The standards a
merchant is held to under Article 2 is honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade. U.C.C. § 2103(1) (b).
135. U.C.C. § 2-609, Comment 4. The Code rejects the purely personal
"good faith" test established by Corn Products Refining Case, 109 A. 505
(N.J. 1920); see also note 133 supra.
136. W. HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES (3d ed. 1976).
137. U.C.C. § 2-609, Comment 4.
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factory assurance may range from a mere promise by a seller of
good repute that he is giving the matter his attention and that
the defect will not be repeated to the requirement of a pledge of
a security by a known corner cutter.
The flexible range of assurances is explored in Kunian v.
Development Corp. of America.138 In Kunian, the buyer's outstanding debt escalated to $38,000, in violation of the express
terms of the contract. The seller demanded assurances and received $5,000 and the buyer's promise to pay the outstanding indebtedness if deliveries continued. Under the circumstances,
and in accordance with commercial standards, these assurances
were deemed to obviate the seller's uncertainty. Thereafter, the
buyer failed to live up to his promises, and the seller demanded
a deposit in escrow sufficient to pay for delivered materials. Obviously, no lesser assurance would be satisfying under the circumstances. The buyer's repeated failure to fulfill his promises
were viewed as cumulative, thus enabling the seller to avoid fur139
ther loss by demanding the deposit.
In Kunian, the buyer's inability to make the deposit in escrow leads to the question of whether it is permissible for one to
vary from the assurance requested. It is manifest from the
wording of the comments that the promisor is free to provide
assurances different from those demanded, so long as the assurances, measured by objective standards, dispel the promisee's
insecurity. 140 Whether it is advisable to vary from the assurances requested depends upon the nature of the demand. If the
demand is clearly immoderate relative to the grounds for insecurity, the risk is slight that a court will later deem the variance
unreasonable, for a promisor will never legally be required to
necessary to remove the promgive more than the assurances
14 1
isee's grounds for insecurity.
138. 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1125 (Conn. 1973).
139. U.C.C. § 2-609, Comment 4 provides that "repeated delinquencies
must be viewed as cumulative." Other examples of assurances given in
commercial settings are found in several cases. In Teeman v. Jurek, 21
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 506 (Minn. 1977), a seller of corn was held not to be entitled to withhold deliveries under § 2-609 where it appeared that he had re-

ceived assurances that his complaints about short weight and grading.
discounts were remedied and he was given the option of directing future
deliveries to an elevator of his choice.
In AMF, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 801 (7th Cir.

1976), a manufacturer of computerized cash registers was held to have repudiated his contract under § 2-609(4) where performance standards tendered
to McDonald's were unacceptable because they permitted excessive down
time, never repaired the delivered prototype, and was unable to satisfy McDonald's that the 23 units on order would work.
140. U.C.C. § 2-609, Comment 4.
141. E.g., National Farmers Org. v. Bartlett & Co., Grain, 22 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 658 .(8th Cir. 1977) (communication that amounted to a statement of
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Problems associated with variance arise only in situations
where the assurances demanded are sufficiently specific. 142 If a
demand is specific and in accordance with common sense and
reasonable business practice, it should be met with the precise
assurance requested. Thus, when a request is made to a delinquent supplier that it provide production and delivery schedules, a response that it will proceed "with all deliberate speed"
is clearly inadequate. 14 3 Where, however, the demand is general, the burden of deciding upon the nature of an adequate assurance is shifted to the promisor. The assurances supplied in a
general demand situation need be only as definite as required to
dispel the promisee's insecurity. 1" Thus, a seller of corn was
held not to be entitled to withhold delivery under section 2-609
where it appeared he had received adequate assurance that his
complaints about short weight and grading discounts would be
remedied by allowing him to direct future deliveries to an eleva145
tor of his own choice.
The breach that results from the failure to provide proper
assurances within a reasonable time not exceeding thirty days
is that of anticipatory repudiation. What constitutes a reasonable time depends upon the circumstances of each particular
case; 146 what is actually reasonable may be less than the full
thirty-day period. 147 A repudiation may be retracted unless the
aggrieved party has acted upon the breach in some manner. 148
To be effective, however, a retraction must be accompanied by
any assurance demanded under section 2-609.149
intention not to perform except on conditions which went beyond the terms
of the contract constituted an anticipatory repudiation).
142. See notes 68-70 and accompanying text supra.
143. Schenectady Steel Co. v. Bruno Trimpoli General Constr. Co., 43
A.D. 234, 350 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1974) (Article 2's underlying rationale was applied even though the contract did not fall within the scope of Article 2.
Here the appellant's failure to give assurances, after all the previous delays,
that it would proceed "with all possible speed" as opposed to the requested
definite schedule justified respondent's termination of the contract).
144. U.C.C. § 2-609, Comment 4.
145. Teeman v. Jurek, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 506 (Minn. 1977). In addition
to giving the buyer his choice of elevators, seller agreed to cancel the grading deductions although it did not revise its evaluation of the delivered
corn.
146. U.C.C. § 2-609, Comment 5.
147. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-609, Comment 5 (Smith-Hurd).
148. U.C.C. § 2-611. The aggrieved party forecloses the possibility of re-

traction by either cancelling, materially changing his position, or otherwise
indicating that he considers the repudiation final.
149. U.C.C. § 2-609, Comment 2 provides: "a repudiation is of course sufficient to give reasonable ground for insecurity and to warrant a request for
assurance as an essential condition of the retraction."
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Finally, the parties may, in some instances, insert clauses in
their contracts which modify the application of section 2-609.
Such provisions must be read against the fact that the requirement of good faith is not subject to modification by agreement. 50 Thus, these clauses may enlarge the protection given
by the section to some extent,15 1 but any clause seeking to set
up arbitrary standards will be held ineffective. Thus, an assignment of performance will not automatically give rise to insecurity when the contract itself provides for adequate security in
the event of an assignment. 15 2 On the other hand, a term in an
installment contract giving the seller, if he deems himself insecure, the option to declare the entire balance immediately due
and payable or to respossess the goods without notice is ineffective under section 2-609.153
Scope
Article 2 of the Code is confined to transactions involving
goods. 54 Since nothing in the text or comments of section 2-609
150. U.C.C. § 2-609, Comment 6 provides:
Clauses seeking to give the protected party exceedingly wide powers to cancel or readjust the contract when ground for insecurity arises
must be read against the fact that good faith is a part of the obligation of
the contract and not subject to modification by agreement and includes,
in the case of a merchant, the reasonable observance of commercial
standards of fair dealing in the trade.
151. Such clauses can enlarge protections by fixing the time within
which a request for assurance must be given, or to define the scope of an
adequate assurance in any reasonable commercial fashion. If however, a
clause sets up an arbitrary standard it will be held to be ineffective. See,
Northwest Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Continental Forest Products, Inc., 10 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 1035 (Ore. 1972) (provision in contract giving unusually broad
powers to cancel the contract to the seller was of doubtful validity under
§ 2-609 if construed to give seller the power to cancel without prior notice
and opportunity to the buyer to respond); accord, Wrighstone, Inc. v. Motter, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 170 (Pa. C.C.P. 1961) (provision giving seller, if he
deems himself insecure, the right to declare balance immediately due and
payable and to repossess without notice was unreasonable).
152. Field v. Golden Triangle Broadcasting, Inc., 451 Pa. 410, 305 A.2d 689
(1973). By agreement of the parties, it was clear that Field was going to
assign his rights to a corporation to be formed. The agreement also provided for the security which the assignee corporation was to provide.
Clearly where adequate assurances of performance are present in the contract, and there has been no change in the circumstances, one may not invoke the protections of § 2-609 to demand additional security. See notes 6263 and accompanying text supra.
153. See note 149 supra.
154. U.C.C. § 2-102 provides:
Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article applies to transactions in goods; it does not apply to any transaction which although in
the form of an unconditional contract to sell or present sale is intended
to operate only as a security transaction nor does this Article impair or
repeal any statute regulating sales to consumers, farmers, or other
specified classes of buyers.
U.C.C. § 2-105 provides in part:
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overrides this limitation, this provision appears to be of limited
applicability. Indeed, several cases construing the section have
reaffirmed its inapplicability as to contracts involving transactions other than those involving goods. 155 Notwithstanding the
article 2 limitation, section 2-609 has been extended to rental
service contracts by allowing a lessee the right to demand owner's certificates from a lessor who was supplying nonconforming
films. 15 6 Similar rights were held to be available to a building
contractor under a construction contract when the promisor, a
city housing authority, threatened repudiation of its written
agreements. 157 Finally, the section has been deemed applicable
to mixed transactions by justifying a general contractor's demand for assurances after a subcontractor failed to install cabi158
net and kitchen fixtures as agreed.
Although section 2-609 is not likely to be fully accepted in
other branches of the law of contracts in the near future, 159 the
general right to demand assurances is gaining partial recognition. Such recognition is desirable for several reasons: the remedy is central to a resolution of the dual nature of the promisee's
dilemma; 60 it is not inherently limited to transactions involving
162
the sale of goods;16 ' and the right is commercially desirable.
(1) "Goods" means all things (including specially manufactured
goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract
for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities. . . and things in action. "Goods" also includes the unborn young of animals and growing crops and other identified things
attached to realty as described in the section on goods to be severed
from realty.
155. Cf. Field v. Golden Triangle Broadcasting, Inc., 451 Pa. 410, 305 A.2d
689 (1973) (sale of a going concern); Ranger Constr. Co. v. Dixie Floor Co.,
433 F. Supp. 442 (D.S.C. 1977) (mixed transaction).
156. Appeal of Productions Unlimited, Inc., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 620 (Vet.
Adm. 1966).
157. Markowitz v. Toledo Met. Hous. Auth., 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 131 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1976).
158. Ellis Mfg. Co. v. Brant, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1416 (Tex. Civ. App.
1972). In determining whether a mixed contract for goods and services
should be covered as a sale of goods the applicable test
for inclusion or exclusion is not whether they are mixed, but, granting
that they are mixed, whether their predominant factor, their thrust,
their purpose, reasonably stated, is the rendition of service, with goods
incidentally involved (e.g., contract with artist for painting) or is a
transaction of sale, with labor incidentally involved (e.g., installation of
a water heater in a bathroom).
Ranger Constr. Co. v. Dixie Floor Co., 433 F. Supp. 442, 444 (D.S.C. 1977).
159. See note 153 and accompanying text supra.
160. See notes 18-26 and accompanying text supra.
161. U.C.C. § 2-609, Comment 2.
162. Beyond Sales of Goods, supra note 19, at 1380.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 14:113

CONCLUSION

To a great extent, section 2-609 has alleviated the definitional and remedial problems created by the recognition of the
doctrine of anticipatory repudiation. The section was created to
provide the aggrieved party with a means to discover the nature
and extent of questionable conduct on the part of a prospective
repudiator, and to provide remedial options. These options clarify the law concerning pre-performance insecurity, and make
the positions of buyers and sellers in the marketplace more secure.
The formulation of the section, however, has created several
unique problems. The concepts of "insecurity" and "assurance"
are indefinite and need to be clarified. The section should stress
that, whenever practical, the parties should include in their contracts specific criteria or standards by which to define such
terms as the parties wish them to be defined. Guidelines for
such modification by agreement should be spelled out in the
comments, and should be binding upon the parties unless they
are unreasonable. These changes need to be incorporated into
section 2-609 in order to provide the certainty that is necessary
in agreements looking to future performance.
Marc W. Sargis

